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VARIANCE BETWEEN PLEADING AND PROOF - VERDICTS - The
Marysville and Colorado Land Company et al. vs. Hyde-No.
12889-Decided November 13, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.
Plaintiff brought action to recover possession of farm land, and for
damages. Defendant pleaded a contract to sell the land to plaintiff, a
failure by plaintiff to pay an installment, xnotice of forfeiture, and an
entry for failure to pay. Plaintiff denied the forfeiture, and at the trial
sought to prove an extension, which the court allowed over defendants'
objection. Defendants then put in evidence tending to disprove any
extension. Verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $4,076.40.
1. Assuming that it was a departure to prove an extension under
a denial of a forfeiture, it was not reversible error, because defendant
was as fully prepared to meet that testimony as if the extension had
been pleaded.
2. Verdict of $4,076.40 for ouster of possession of farm land
for eleven months, not so excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice
on the part of the jury.-Afflrmed.
RECEIVERSHIP-R E C E I V E R' S COMPENSATION-INTERLOCUTORY
AWARD NOT SUPPORT WRIT OF ERROR-Lee vs. First State
Bank of Keenesburg, et al.-No. 13154-Tolland Company vs.
Same-No. 13155-Decided December 4, 1933--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Campbell.
A tentative or interlocutory award of fees to a receiver, made dur-
ing the progress of the receivership, does not constitute a final judgment
and is not reviewable by writ of error.-Writ of error dismissed with-
out prejudice.
REAL ESTATE BROKERS-FORBIDDEN SERVICE-WHAT CONSTI-
TUTES--Schwartz vs. Weiner-No. 12913-Decided December
4, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Weiner, having no Real Estate Brokers' license, alleged that
he was employed by Schwartz to assist in the purchase of an apartment
house. Defendant contended that the failure of Weiner to have a li-
cense precluded recovery. Upon conflicting evidence a verdict was
rendered for Weiner.
2. The contention of the defendant that (1) a suit cannot be
maintained to recover for a forbidden service is sound, but (2) under
the statute, one not licensed, even though not actually in the business,
may not engage even in an isolated transaction is unsound.
The section of the statute which provided that two acts or offers
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to act within any calendar year constituted the person so acting or
offering a broker or salesman was repealed. The repeal of the statute
did not prohibit a person, not in the business, from acting in even an
isolated transaction, rather did it leave the right to act the same as if
the statute had never been passed.
3. It was not error to permit the plaintiff to amend his com-
plaint so as to seek greater damages than originally asked for when the
verdict is within the amount originally sought, and the records disclose
no possible influence of the amendment on the verdict.-Judment
affirmed.
CORPORATIONS-FAILURE TO PAY LICENSE TAX AS DISSOLUTION-
Bokel vs. Zitnik-No. 13008-Decided November 27, 1933-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Plaintiff brought ejectment to recover possession of real estate.
Complaint alleged that the property was conveyed to plaintiff by the
last board of directors of a corporation which had previously been
declared defunct under C. L. '21, sec. 2317, for failure to pay its annual
license tax for over five years. To this defendant demurred. C. L. '21,
sec. 2295, provides that upon "dissolution" of a corporation, its last
board of directors has power to dispose of its property. Demurrer sus-
tained by the trial court; plaintiff brought writ of error.
-1. Since C. L. '21, sec. 2317, provides for reinstatement of a
defunct corporation by payment of its delinquent annual taxes, it is
not dissolved, but its operation is merely suspended until reinstated.
Hence the directors had no title to convey to plaintiff.
2. In ejectment suits plaintiff must rely upon the strength of his
own title.-Affirmed.
MOTOR VEHICLES--NEGLIGENCE-RIGHT OF WAY-INSTRUCTIONS
TO JURIES-COMPETENCY OF JURORS-Potts et at. vs. Bird-
No. 1291 1-Decided November 27, 1933--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Holland.
1. Based upon contradictory evidence concerning an accident
occurring in an intersection of two streets, a verdict was had for the
plaintiff. The statute provides, "* * * the operator of a vehicle shall
yield the right of way at intersection of their paths to a vehicle ap-
proaching from the right, unless such vehicle from the right is farther
from the point of the intersection of their paths than first named ve-
hicle."
2. The Court then instructed the jury that " '* * * unless such
vehicle from the right is farther from the point of the intersection of
their paths than such first named vehicle' are superfluous, meaningless,
and should be considered by the jury."
3. The instruction was wrong. The statute was and is in full
force and effect.
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4,. During the examination of the jury panel, plaintiff's counsel
was permitted over the objection of the defendants' to ask individually
whether the particular juror questioned was "an agent, employee, stock-
holder or interested member in the State Farm Auto Mutual Insurance
Company." It is admitted that the question is a proper one if asked
collectively. Any question that is proper to propound collectively cer-
tainly is a proper question to be propounded individually.-Judgment
reversed and remanded.
DISSENTING OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE BURKE
Instruction as given is harmonious with the opinion of this Court
in Hicks vs. Cramer. The part of the Pueblo ordinance held invalid in
that case read, "In the event one or more of two or more vehicles shall
have entered an intersection, the one nearest the center of the intersec-
tion shall have the right of way."
CONCURRING OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE BUTLER
The right of way provision in the statute is free from ambiguity
and confusion. Words could not make it clearer. The criticism of the
statutory provision actually is that a better or more reasonable regula-
tion could be adopted. That is a question for legislative not judicial
determination. "Reckless drivers, like the poor, shall be with us al-
w'ays. Such drivers will race for the intersection of the lines of travel
of the cars or for the street crossing, whichever will give them the right
of way." The statute does not give a license to race for intersections.
Even when a driver has the right of way, he must be careful. "* * *
the fact that he has won the race will be no protection to him. * * *
The right of way won by negligent racing can hardly be considered a
prize." It carries with it no profit; it reflects neither honor nor glory
upon the victor.
NEGLIGENCE-EVIDENCE-QUESTIONS FOR JURY-Denver Tram-
way Corp. vs. Mary R. Burke-No. 12912-Decided December
11, 1933-Decision by Mr. Justice Burke.
Defendant in error testified that the driver of Tramway's bus
stopped suddenly at an intersection, and that the bus stopped practi-
cally in the center of the street. No signal was given by the bus driver
signifying an intended stop, nor was the red light flashed on in the
rear of the bus.
1. Evidence of negligence of bus driver by reason of unreason-
able abruptness of stop, and the unreasonable position near the center
of the street was clear.
2. "Ordinarily a driver who collides with a car ahead of him,
going in the same direction, is negligent, but not always so. Surround-
ing facts and circumstances are always relevant and material and may
throw an entirely different light on the question.'--Judgment affirmed.
Campetl and Holland, JJ., dissent.
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HABEAS CORPUS-FOREIGN JUDGMENTS--FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
-CUSTODY OF CHILDREN-The People etc. on Relation of Fred
Wagner vs. Emily Wagner Torrence-No. 13047-Decided De-
cember 11, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Fred Wagner, father of two children, sought a writ of habeas
corpus from a Colorado court to obtain the custody of his two children
from the mother, his divorced wife. In 1927 the parties were divorced
in Wisconsin and custody of the children went to the mother. The
mother decided that the health of one child required removal to Colo-
rado and she brought the children to that state.
The father, ex parte, obtained a judgment in the Wisconsin court
on showing that the wife had violated the custody order by removing
the children from Wisconsin, awarding him the custody.
1. The trial court denied the writ and the Supreme Court af-
firmed the ruling, pointing out that the children had acquired a Colo-
rado domicile, and the interest of the children was the controlling
consideration for the Colorado court. That court had decided that the
best interests of the children were served by continuing the custody in
the mother.
2. Recognition of the Wisconsin ruling by the Colorado court
was not compelled under the full faith and credit clause for the reason
that the Wisconsin judgment relied upon was in effect ex parte and for
the added reason that the fundamental consideration is the interest of
the children determined by the court of their domicile.
INSURANCE-TRIAL-Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Com-
pany vs. Brennaman-No. 12947-Decided December 11, 1933
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Beneficiary under accident insurance policy sued insurer for face
amount of policy. The complaint alleged that insured died from bod-
ily injuries sustained through accidental means by reason of having
been shot through the head by a bullet from a firearm in the hands of
party whose name plaintiff does not know. Defendant denied this
allegation and further answered that insured came to his death by sui-
cide within one year after issuance of the policy and that such death
within one year after issuance of the policy, and that such death within
said time was expressly excepted from the liability of defendant under
said policy. Upon trial plaintiff recovered judgment for face amount
of policy.
Held: The entire testimony offered was brief and not of an en-
lightening character. No error is found in admission or rejection of
evidence. Trial court had opportunity to observe the witnesses and
from that observation and the demeanor of the witnesses it was able,
after a full consideration of case, to arrive at its conclusion based upon
conflicting evidence, which was sufficient to sustain the findings and
judgment. Such findings are conclusive on the Supreme Court.--Judg-
ment affirmed.
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PLEADING---SHAM PLEADING-DEMURRER--CHANGING CAUSE OF
ACTION IN AMENDED COMPLAINTS-Eastenes vs. Adams, et al.
-No. 12735-Decided September 18, 1933--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck.
Plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, sued in the District
Court to recover damages for the death of her husband from a gunshot
wound alleged to have been fired by some one of 20 persons who in-
cluded the defendants, the particular one firing the shot not being
known to the plaintiff. Six different amendments to the complaint were
made, the original complaint practically charging that the defendants,
including William H. Adams, then Governor of Colorado, and certain
peace officers with entering into a conspiracy to murder plaintiff's hus-
band and then by successive amendments, changing the cause of action
to that of the Governor of Colorado, the peace officers and a mining
company with unlawfully seeking to override a strike of coal miners
by assuming military dictatorship in the course of which the plaintiff's
husband was shot and killed by someone unknown during an alterca-
tion between striking miners and the peace officers. The original com-
plaint and successive complaints were attacked as sham pleadings, which
were overruled but demurrer was sustained to last amended complaint
and plaintiff elected to stand and cause was dismissed.
1. A cause of action cannot, by amended complaint, be shifted
to an entirely different basis.
2. Where a complaint is attacked as a sham pleading and is sup-
ported by affidavits clearly showing that it is sham and counter affidavits
or showing is insufficient, such pleading should be summarily stricken,
and it is error for the court to refuse to strike it.
3. The demurrer to amended complaint was properly sustained.
It is apparent from the amended complaint that the defendant coal com-
pany had only exercised its rights in seeking the aid of the Governor
and peace officers against the threatened onslaughts by persons tres-
passing on its property after they had been duly warned to stay away,
but are shown to have been in the actual or attempted commission of
crime when the plaintiff's husband was killed.-Judgment affirmed.
CRIMINAL LAW-CHANGE OF VENUE -CONFESSION- VERDICT
CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE--Saiz, Vigil and Montoyo vs. The Peo-
ple of the State of Colorado-No. 13313-Decided September 18,
1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Defendants below were charged with the murder of one George
Arnold. Upon a verdict of guilty, fixing the penalty at death, judg-
ment was entered below.
1. Where application for change of venue on the ground that the
feeling among the people of the county was such that the defendants
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could not have a fair trial and same was not verified or supported, the
evidence and record will be examined and held, in this case, that the
court did not abuse its discretion in denying same.
2. When a written confession is offered and defendants object
on the ground that they did not confess and that any alleged confes-
sion was obtained by duress and fear, the question of admissibility is
primarily for the trial court. In this case, this issue was tried to the
court out of the hearing of the jury, which was proper. After examina-
tion of the record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admit-
ting the confession.
3. The record is without error.-Judgment affirmed and defend-
ants ordered executed during the week ending November 18, 1933
DAMAGES--REVERSAL FOR INADEQUACY OF-FRAUD--WILLFUL
DECEIT-Lynch vs. The Kuhtmann Investment Co., et al.-No.
12939-Decided September 18, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
Parties are the same here as below; defendants as real estate brokers
negotiated a trade of plaintiff's property and plaintiff thereafter brought
suit, claiming that defendants were her agents and had defrauded her
and asked for $1,500.00 actual and $2,000.00 exemplary damages and
prayed body execution.
Jury returned verdict for $196.54 actual damages, and found
defendants guilty of fraud and willful deceit. Plaintiff dissatisfied with
small verdict prosecuted writ of error.
1. That the defendants were plaintiff's agents and that they de-
frauded her are settled by the verdict and special finding of the jury.
2. The sole remaining question is the amount of the damages.
Even where the evidence is conflicting upon the amount of damages, the
Supreme Court will examine the evidence, and where such evidence,
viewed in its most favorable light as to conflicts, discloses damages ex-
ceeding the verdict, the cause will be reversed, especially where no pos-
sible interpretation of the admitted facts can bring them within reason-
able range of the verdict.-Reversed and remanded for new trial on
amount of damages only.
CRIMINAL LAW-MURDER-INSTRUCTIONS-FIRST OR SECOND DE-
GREE-Jones vs. The People of the State of Colorado-No.
13299-Decided September 18, 1933.
Jones and Nelson were charged with murder of the first degree in
killing Hartford Johnson. The jury found them both guilty of first
degree murder. Jones was sentenced to death; Nelson to life imprison-
ment. Jones alone seeks reversal on the ground that he requested the
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court below to give an instruction on second degree murder which was
refused, the court charging the jury that they might find the defendant
guilty of first degree murder or not guilty.
1. Where the defendant fails to preserve the evidence by bill
of exceptions lodged in Supreme Court, all presumptions are in favor
of the regularity of the ruling of the trial court.
2. Where murder is committed by means of poison or lying in
wait, or in the perpetration of, or in an attempt to perpetrate, one of
the felonies specified in Sec. 6665, C. L. 1921, there is only one degree
of murder, namely, murder in the first degree. If the uncontradicted evi-
dence is to the effect that murder was committed in one of the ways
specified and in no other way, the question of second degree murder
is not in the case, and the defendant should be found guilty of murder
in the first degree or he should be acquitted.--Judgment affirmed with
directions.
DAMAGES-RAILROADS-VERDICT-NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
-The Grand River Valley Railway Company vs. Murphy-No.
12987-Decided November 20, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Burke.
Mrs. Murphy recovered judgment below for $9,000.00 personal
injuries and $200.00 damages to automobile in collision between auto-
mobile and interurban car. Defendant filed motion for new trial, one
of the principal grounds of which was newly discovered evidence. It
appeared that the newly discovered evidence consisted of proof that im-
mediately before and immediately succeeding the trial she exhibited no
evidence of injury, but that during the trial she appeared to be in con-
stant pain, unable to use her right leg and required the assistance of two
people in entering or leaving the Court room.
1. While the trial Court is vested with wide discretion in grant-
ing or refusing motion for new trial on grounds of newly discovered
evidence it was an abuse of discretion in this case in failing to grant the
motion.--Judgment reversed.
CONTRACTS--CONSTRUCTION-INTENT OF PARTIES-The National
Sales Corporation vs. Dennis--No. 13403-Decided November
20, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
The National Sales Corporation claiming, to own a mill and its
e-quipment, alleged that one Lehman had pretended to sell to Dennis a
separator connected with the mill and that Dennis was attempting to
remove it and prayed for an injunction and damages. The Court be-
low found that Lehman owned this separator and Dennis had title to
it. Judgment was given for Dennis.
1. In interpreting a contract Courts must endeavor to ascertain
and effectuate the intent of the parties to it.
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2. Surrounding facts and circumstances when necessary should
be resorted to in order to determine such intent.
3. Applying these rules to the present transaction the contract
between the National Sales Corporation and Lehman in no manner in-
volved the separator and that Lehman had full title to convey the same
to Dennis.-Judgment affirmed.
MANDAMUS-WHEN PROPER-DISCHARGE OF CIVIL SERVICE EM-
PLOYEES IN DENVER-PROCEDURE THEREFOR-Bratton et at.
vs. Dice-No. 13938-Decided December 11, 1933--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Mandamus was brought by Dice, a member of the classified serv-
ice of the Denver Police force, against the Manager of Safety and Ex-
cise and the members of the Denver Civil Service Commission. He was
summarily suspended for three days and deprived of his salary for that
period by the Manager of Safety and Excise, without charges being
filed, notice or opportunity to be heard, for failure to enforce a traffic
rule. Dice appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which refused to
give him a hearing on the ground that it had no jurisdiction. Denver
Charter provided (Sec. 224) that the Commission had power to make
rules; (Sec. 238) that "all persons shall retain their positions until
discharged," and that discharges from the classified service should be
only after written charges filed, notice to the person sought to be dis-
charged with a copy of the charges, and a reasonable time for him to
answer them in writing. The rules of the Commission provided for
the various acts required by the Charter in case of discharge or demo-
tion, but provided that the appointing officer might suspend a subordi-
nate for any period less than a month as a matter of discipline, without
notice or hearing. Dice contended that in so far as the Commission's
rule failed to make provision for written charges, notice and hearing in
case of suspension, the rule was invalid as being contrary to the Char-
ter. Court below held for Dice.
1. Mandamus will properly lie. Remedy to bring ordinary ac-
tion to collect pay is inadequate-what Dice wants is to have this blot
expunged from his record, and for that mandamus alone is an adequate
remedy.
2. Purpose of Civil Service Laws is stability to tenure.
3. Authority given by Charter to Commission to make rules is
limited by provisions in the Charter as to what those rules must con-
tain.
4. After probation, the tenure of Civil Service employees is per-
manent except upon discharge in the manner provided by Charter.
5. Although Charter does not expressly provide for a hearing, it
does so impliedly, otherwise the written charges and opportunity to
answer would be futile.
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6. Charter intended as a protection to Civil Service employees
from arbitrary action of their superiors.
7. Dictum that an employee may be suspended pending deter-
mination of charges against him, and full reinstatement if charges un-
founded.-Affirmed.
UNLAWFUL ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT-EVIDENCE-EVIDENCE
OF OTHER PROCEEDINGS, ADMISSIBLE WHEN-ABSENCE OF
WITNESSES-CONTINUANCE WHEN---Smith vs. Phelps et at.-
No. 12985-.Decided December 11, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Jus-
tice Hilliard.
1. Suit for unlawful arrest and imprisonment. Plaintiff had
been convicted of assault and battery. Having failed to pay his fine, a
mittimus issued several days after his stay of execution had expired, and
the plaintiff was confined to jail. This is the basis of the present suit
against the District Attorney and several other officials. As evidence,
plaintiff attempted to show alleged irregularities in his trial for assault
and battery. The evidence was rejected. It should have been. Irreg-
ularities, if they existed, could be reviewed only in the Supreme Court
upon writ of error. Nothing else shown would tend to prove that the
prosecution was out of the ordinary.
2. It is not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court to
refuse a recess because of the absence of witnesses, unless reason is shown
for the absence of the witnesses and unless the court is advised of the
matters about which the witness intends to testify.-Judgment af-
firmed.
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS-SUITS UPON-HOMESTEAD RIGHTS--Duling
vs. Salaz-No. 12988-Decided November 6, 1933--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
1. Plaintiff obtained a U. S. patent on a homestead entry. Ap-
proximately four years prior thereto, a New Mexico judgment was
entered against the plaintiff for a breach of promise to marry, which
judgment was sued upon in the district court and judgment thereon
was entered against the plaintiff. A transcript of the Colorado judg-
ment was filed in the recorder's office and an execution thereon was
issued and the plaintiff claimed his exemption under his homestead.
Plaintiff brought this action to restrain the sheriff of Las Animas
County from selling the land which he claimed exempt. The injunc-
tion was granted and the defendant alleged error.
2. The Federal statute under which the exemption is claimed
provides that no land acquired under the homestead law shall become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the issuance of
patent. The contention of the sheriff that this is an obligation based
upon tort is untenable. Whatever might have been the prior status of
the promise to marry, it became merged into the New Mexico judgment




MENT OF DECEASED TO MAKE MONTLHY PAYMENTS TO
CLAIMANT FOR LIFE-Williams, Administrator vs. Miller-No.
13202-Decided November 20, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Campbell.
Miller filed his claim in probate court against estate of deceased for
the allowance of $100 per month during claimant's life based upon
alleged contract whereby the claimant conveyed certain farm property
to deceased in consideration of the deceased conveying to claimant an
apartment building in Denver and guaranteeing to claimant, an old
man, that the deceased would pay the claimant $100 per month during
the rest of claimant's life.
JUDGMENT BELOW FOR CLAIMANT.
1. There was sufficient evidence to justify verdict of the jury
finding that the contract between claimant and deceased was that de-
ceased was to pay claimant $100 a month during the lifetime of claim-
ant regardless of whether or not the income from the apartment house
equalled $100 per month.-Judment affirmed.
APPEAL AND ERROR--CRIMINAL LAW-C. H. Carlson and Charles
Schupp vs. The People-No. 13405-Decided November 27,
1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouch.
1. Where no error is assigned as to the information or as to the
rulings on evidence or as to the giving of instructions, the record shows
no tendered instruction refused, the instructions given fully and fairly
presented the law of the case, there is no complaint against the method
of selecting the jurors and there was substantial conflict in the evidence
and a verdict of guilty was rendered, the conviction of defendants upon
a charge of burglary was affirmed.-Judgment affirmed.
PLEADING- DEMURRER- COMPLAINT LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO
SUSTAIN IT--J. F. Musgrove vs. W. E. Brown--No. 12964-
Decided November 27, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Brown sued Musgrove, the Denver Motor Hotel Company and
others for breach of contract, in that they failed to pay his moving
expenses of $746.18 as promised and agreed.
At the trial, a demurrer on the ground that the complaint did not
state a cause of action was interposed for the first time, orally and by
objection to the evidence. The demurrer was overruled and judgment
went for the plaintiff in the sum asked.
The general demurrer was not waived for failure to interpose it
before trial, but if a cause of actibn by resorting to liberal construction
can be spelled out of the complaint, the court will bold the complaint
good against a demurrer interposed at the trial.
DICTA 89
CRIMINAL LAW-INFORMATION---COURT'S CONFERENCE WITH JUR-
OR-Dill vs. The People of the State of Colorado-No. 13190-
Decided Notember 27, 1933-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Defendant was convicted of violating Sec. 6946, C. L. '21, by
obtaining money for corporate stock by a swindling or cheating trans-
action. Defendant demurred because the information did not contain
an allegation of criminal intent. Defendant also moved to quash on
the ground that Sec. 3 of the statute alleged to be violated provided
that the jury should determine the law and the fact, and that such
section was contrary to the state constitution. Defendant also, on the
day of the trial, filed a plea in bar raising the statute of limitations and
asked for a directed verdict on the ground of no answer to the plea.
Motion for a directed verdict was overruled and the district attorney
was given leave to answer the plea, which was done after the jury had
been sworn in, and a recess was thereupon taken until the next day,
when the case was tried over the objection of the defendant.
When the taking of testimony was almost completed the district
attorney in chambers in the presence of defendant's counsel, newspaper
men and the court, stated that one juror had been in conversation with
a friend of the defendant. The taking of the testimony was then com-
pleted, the jury instructed, sent to the jury room. Then the juror in
question was summoned to the judge's chambers. After a conversation
between the judge and the juror alone, in which the juror denied that
he had talked with any friend of the defendant, the juror was sent back
to the jury room with instructions not to say anything about the con-
ference with the judge. In the meantime, the other jurors had seen a
newspaper bearing headlines that a charge of jury fixing had been made
in the case. Defendant alleges the conduct of the judge was prejudicial
error and also urges the points made below by demurrer, motion and
plea. Held:
1. In an information for a statutory crime, allegation of crimi-
nal intent is not necessary.
2. The section of the statute providing that the jury shall try
the law and the fact is unconstitutional and void but the remainder of
the statute is not affected thereby, and the case was tried in accordance
with the constitution.
3. It was within the discretion of the court to allow an answer
to the plea in bar after the jury had been sworn in, since the plea was
not filed until the day of the trial.
4. There was no prejudice from the conduct of the trial judge
in interviewing the juror. However, the trial judges are warned
against such practice.
Judgment affirmed. Mr. Justice Hilliard dissents on the ground
that the conduct of the trial judge regarding the juror was reversible
error and it did not affirmatively appear that no prejudice resulted.
THE MEYER MORTUARY
112 East Fourteenth Ave.
Denver, Colo.






We Solicit All Legal Printing
DAY AND NIGHT SERVICE
2031 Curtis Street Phone KEystone 5406
The PARK LANE
Offers
A COMFORTABLE HOME FOR THE COM-
ING YEAR to those who would be apprecia-
tive of comfort ... of furniture and drapery
such as grace homes of taste and culture ...
of little courtesies which mean large content-
ment . . . of charm and environment
of many services, including the Park Lane
Bus, the Food Shop, Beauty and Barber Shop,
the Modern Fireproof Garage and the Excel-




Denver's Finest Transient Hotel APARTMENTS
Happy
New Year
New Year's Day is characteristically a day of joy
and optimism on which we plan constructively for
the future. In the carrying out of our plans for
personal, industrial and community advancement,
we depend to a large extent upon the services ren-
dered by the Electrical Industry-an industry whose
dealers keep available a host of modern, efficient and
economical electrical appliances for the speedy, care-
free performance of household duties and for the en-
hancement of comfort and pleasure-an industry
whose serving companies keep in readiness facilities
to meet the customary as well as the unexpected
power demands made upon them
Noteworthy. too, is the fact that despite wide fluc-
tuations in living costs, the cost of electrical service
has steadily and unceasingly moved downward, mak-
ing possible an ever greater use of electrical servants,
and contributing materially to the success of the
national recovery program





Trustee under Corporate Mortgages
Depository for Protective Committees . .
Transfer Agent and Registrar for Corporate
Stock Miscellaneous Fiscal Agencies.
Services to Individuals and Families
Executor and Administrator of Estates
Trustee under Wills . . Trustee of Living




BUSINESS SERVICE FOR BUSINESS MEN
AND WOMEN AND THEIR COUNSEL.
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
I.
